RECENT CASES
Procedure-Fair Labor Standards Act-Enforceability of a Consent Judgment[Federal].-The respondent consented to a judgment whereby it agreed to abide by the
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act and to pay its employees the back wages
due them under the act. The administrator of the act, alleging that the respondent
failed to adhere to the stipulation in the judgment pertaining to the payment of back
wages, applied for a rule directing the respondent to show cause why it should not be
adjudged guilty of contempt of court. The court found that some of the respondent's
employees had voluntarily waived their claims to the back pay when it had been offered to them, and that those who had not waived had received their pay and had not
subsequently been discriminated against. Held, first, that since the stipulation failed
to state the names of the employees to be benefited, it was void for want of certainty;
but that if the stipulation were valid, it should be enforced by execution and not by
contempt proceedings. Second, that in the absence of fraud or coercion, the employees
had the power to waive their back pay and the respondent had the power to accept the
waivers. Petition dismissed. Fleming v. Warshawsky & Co.,
Although the labor standards act grants the administrator the power to enjoin the
2
transportation or sale in interstate commerce of goods made in violation of the act, a
desire to obtain a more direct method of enforcing the provisions of the act early led to
the development and use of consent judgments.3 Such a judgment binds the employer
not to violate the act in the future and to pay the back wages due his employees, while
the administrator agrees not to enjoin the sale or transportation of the employer's
goods produced in violation of the act. It is the usual practice in enforcing the act
through consent judgments not to specify in the stipulation the names of employees
4
entitled to receive back pay, this detail being informally agreed to by the administrator and the employer after the signing of the decree.s Specification in advance of
* 3 C.C.H. Lab. Law Serv. 6o,146 (D.C. Ill. i94o).
* The so-called "hot goods" provision. 52 Stat. io69 (1938), 29 U.S.C.A. § 217 (Supp. 1940);
Fleming v. DeVera, 3 C.C.H. Lab. Law Serv. 6o,175 (D.C. Puerto Rico i94o). The constitutionality of this power has been upheld by the Supreme Court. United States v. Darby
Lumber Co., 6i S. Ct. 451 (1941).
may be attributed to two factors: First the
3 "The large number of consent decrees ....
Act .... seems on relatively sound constitutional ground, [upheld by the Supreme Court:
United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 61 S. Ct. 45i (194I)] second, fines imposed by the judges
who have presided in the criminal cases are heavy." Herman, The Administration and Enforcement of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 6 Law & Contemp. Prob. 368, 388 (1939); cf.
Donovan and McAllister, Consent Decrees in the Enforcement of Federal Anti-Trust Laws,
46 Harv. L. Rev. 885, 911 (I933).
4 Cf. Fleming v. Sunbury Shirt Co., Inc., 3 C.C.H. Lab. Law Serv.
6o,128 (D.C. N.Y.
i94o). The Wages & Hours Reporter weekly summarizes the consent decrees obtained by the
administrator. In the majority of these summaries neither the names nor the number of employees or the amounts due in back pay are mentioned.
s Although this method has been used since the beginning of the enforcement of the act,
in only one case has the fairness of the administrator's determination of these details after
entry of the judgment been challenged. In Fleming v. Sunbury Shirt Co., Inc., 3 C.C.H.
Lab. Law Serv. 6o,128 (D.C. N.Y. 194o), the court, while admitting that the stipulation
could have been made more specific, refused to adopt the employer's contention that the
provisions of the stipulation did not give the administrator the right to fix the amount due the
employees.
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judgment could easily be made, if necessary. In the instant case, however, not only
was a schedule of the names of the employees and the amounts due to each compiled by
the administrator, but the respondent agreed to the schedule and in fact paid some employees thereunder. Since employees thus entitled were ascertained, it seems that the
stipulation was not so uncertain as to justify the court in holding it void.
In the principal case, the consent order, although called a "judgment, ' 6 was in the
nature of a decree in equity. The stipulation as to the back pay was incorporated by
reference into the consent judgment.7 Federal Rule 69(a) provides: "Process to enforce a judgment for the payment of money shall be a writ of execution, unless the
court directs otherwise ..... " It has been suggested that, under the Federal Rules,
"a federal court should not .... enforce a money judgment by contempt or methods
other than a writ of execution, except in the unusual case."' The courts, however, in
similar cases under the labor standards act have held a contempt proceeding to be the
proper method of enforcing a consent judgment.9 Furthermore, the source of Rule
69(a) is Equity Rule 8 which allowed, in the discretion of the court, the use of a writ of
execution if the decree be solely for the payment of money.' 0 If Rule 69(a) substantially
adopts prior practice, it seems that, as the judgment in the principal case consisted of
more than a payment order, the stipulation should be enforced by contempt proceedings. But if the rule encompasses all orders for the payment of money, the court has
discretion to determine the method of enforcing its order. As the rule clearly states
that execution should be the method in the usual case, the decision in the present case
would be correct in enforcing an ordinary money judgment." Since, however, the
primary purpose of the judgment was not the payment of back wages to employees but
the enforcement of a federal statute, it would seem that contempt proceedings are
proper.

2

6According to Rule 54 of the Federal Rules a judgment "includes a decree and any order
from which an appeal lies." This definition seems to remove any formal significance from the
title of a court order.
7 "Further ordered, adjudged and decreed that the stipulation made this day between the
parties hereto and filed herein be, and it hereby is incorporated in and made a part of this
judgment, and that defendant do and perform each and every act and thing set forth in the
said stipulation." Cited in principal case.
8 3 Moore and Friedman, Federal Practice § 69.02 (1938).
9 Fleming v. De Vera, 3 C.C.H. Lab. Law Serv. 60,175 (D.C. Puerto Rico i94o); Fleming v. North Georgia Mfg. Co., 33 F. Supp. o005
(Ga. 1940); Fleming v. Sunbury Shirt Co.,
Inc., 3 C.C.H. Lab. Law Serv. 6o,i28 (D.C. N.Y. 1940); 3 Wages & Hours Rep. col. 3, P. 321
(July 29, 1940); 3 Wages & Hours Rep., col. i, p. i68 (April 29, i94o); cf. NLRB v. Carlisle
Lumber Co., io8 F. (2d) i88 (C.C.A. 9th 1939).

103 Moore and Friedman, Federal Practice §69.oi (1938).
11It may be suggested that the "unless" clause of the rule is meant to apply to morally
shocking situations, such as Buck v. Buck, 6o Ill. ioS (I871), where the defendant was ruled
in contempt of court in not complying with a decree ordering him to support and educate an
adopted child.
12 Cf. Agwilines, Inc. v. NLRB, 87 F. (2d) 146, zSi (C.C.A.
5 th i936), where, in upholding
a reinstatement with back pay order of the NLRB, the court said, "A cease and desist order
operating retrospectively is not a private award ..... It is a public reparation order, operating
retrospectively ....

cate ..... "

as to unfair practices ....

which ....

Congress has the right to eradi-
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It may be contended that it would be inequitable to subject the employer to contempt proceedings if he were financially unable to pay the back wages due. If an employer wishes to sign a consent judgment but is unable to pay the amount due, he may
arrange for installment payments. 3 Indeed, the danger of hardship on the employer
may be greater if an execution were levied against him, since it would then be necessary
to pay at once the entire amount due.4 Furthermore, the execution of judgments would
be controlled by the laws of the respective states.' s The result may be different degrees of enforceability among the several states, with a competitive advantage to
those employers located in the more lenient states.
On the other hand, the administrator has no specific power under the act to sue on
a consent judgment for back pay due the employees, and it is doubtful if a court would
rule that an employee is the proper party to bring such an action.' 6 If the decision in
the instant case is not reversed,'7 the administrator may find it expedient to propose to
Congress an amendment extending his powers under the act. If the amendment is not
enacted, it would seem that stipulations as to back pay contained in consent judgments
are unenforceable.' 8 As the consent judgment is the most widely-used device to enforce the act, 9 the result of the present case is unfortunate.
The court also held that the employee's right to back compensation was a legal
right which, in the absence of coercion, could be waived. Since an employee cannot
In the instant case, the employer arranged for nine equal monthly installments.
In New York, a judgment debtor may be allowed installment payments according to his
ability to pay. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Ann. (Gilbert-Bliss, Supp. 194o) § 793. There is no analagous
provision in Illinois.
ISRev. Stat. § 788 (x875), 28 U.S.C.A. § 504 (1928); Rev. Stat. § 916 (1875), 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 727 (s928); Ill. Rev. Stat. (1939) c. 22, § 47; Walsh, Equity 62 (1930).
X6 The question has not been decided under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Cf. Amalgamated
Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 309 U.S. 26z (1940), where it
was held that the NLRB is the sole authority to institute proceedings for civil contempt of a
decree of enforcement. The NLRB is given the power to order affirmative action, such as the
reinstatement of employees with or without back pay (49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. § 16o(c)
(Supp. i94o) ), and the power to seek enforcement of their order in the courts (49 Stat. 453
1s

'4

(1935), 29 U.S.C.A. § 16o(e) (Supp. 5940 ) ); see i C.C.H. Lab. Law Serv.

5176 (i94o).

Cf. Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 7,9 (i954), amended by 43 Stat. 939 (1925),
15 U.S.C.A. §45 (r927); FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 25 (1929).
'7 Appeal filed February 14, 1941.
z8 The unenforceability of such a stipulation would not mean that the employer is absolved
from the duty to pay his employees the back wages due. Under the provisions of the act,
the employee is given the right of action granting him double indemnity for unpaid compensation plus costs and reasonable attorney's fees. 52 Stat. 5o69 (1938), 29 U.S.C.A. §216(b) (Supp.
1940). This cause of action is available to the employee even though he was employed under a
contract executed prior to the enactment of the act, fixing his wages and hours below the
standard set by the act. Emerson v. Mary Lincoln Candies, Inc., 173 Misc. 531, 17 N.Y.S. (2d)
85I (S. Ct. 1940).

The employer may also be subjected to a criminal prosecution for failure to observe the
provisions of the act. 52 Stat. io69 (1938), 29 U.S.C.A. § 256(a) (Supp. I94O).
'9 The Wages & Hours Reporter weekly summarizes the legal activity of the administrator.
The number of consent decrees is always several times all other types of legal proceedings combined.
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waive his right to be presently compensated according to the standards set by the
act," he should likewise be unable to waive his back pay. Furthermore, subtle forms of
coercion difficult to prove, may be used by the employer. Even if the employer is financially unable immediately to pay the back wages due, waiver of back pay should
not be allowed because the administrator will agree to lenient installment payments
in the consent judgment, "2 or the courts, upon proof of financial incapacity, will ar3
range amicable settlements.

Procedure-Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-Applicability to Enforcement of Administrative Subpoena--[Federal].-The National Labor Relations Board applied to
a federal district court for an order requiring the respondent corporation to obey subpoenas duces tecum issued by the board., The company, alleging that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure govern these proceedings, moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because no complaint had been filed nor summons issued as required by the
rules. Held, inter alia, that the Federal Rules are inapplicable.3 NLRB v. GoodyearTire
Rubber Co.4
Proceedings to enforce administrative subpoenas are not specifically excepted from
the operation of the Federal Rules by Rule 81. Hence, an inference may be drawn that
they are within the scope of the rules as "suits of a civil nature ....cognizable as
cases at law or in equity" under Rule i.
It may be argued, however, that the enabling act, which empowers the Supreme
Court to prescribe rules for "civil actions at law"s as well as for "suits in equity,"'6 does
not authorize the Court to dictate the practice in these statutory proceedings. The
(2d) 85i (S. Ct.
20 Cf. Emerson v. Mary Lincoln Candies, Inc., I73 Misc. 531, 17 N.Y.S.
1940).
2 The danger of the widespread use of "kickback" methods has been recognized by the
Federal Government (46 Stat. 1494 (i93i), as amended by 49 Stat. ioi1 (1935), 40 U.S.C.A.
§ 276(a) (Supp. i94o) ) and by New York (N.Y. Cons. Laws (McKinney, 1938) c. 39, § 962).
See also Fleming v. North Georgia Mfg. Co., 33 F. Supp. ioo5, ioo6 (Ga. 194o); Wage &
Hour Rel. No. R-9
9 (Nov. 21, 1938); 2 C.C.H. Lab. Law Serv. 33,IIg (1940); 2 C.C.H.Lab.
Law Serv. 33,253 (1940).
"2Cf. principal case. See note i6 supra.
23Fleming v. Phipps, 35 F. Supp. 627 (Md. i94o); Fleming v. North Georgia Mfg. Co.,
33 F. Supp. ioo5 (Ga. i94o).
'49 Stat. 456 (Y935), 29 U.S.C.A. § 161(2) (Supp. 1940).
'Federal Rules 3 , 4.
3 In general see Applicability of the Federal Rules to Enforcement of Administrative Sub;.
poenas, 2 Fed. Rules Serv. z.5 i (I94O).
4 7 Lab. Rel. Rep. 363 (D.C. Ohio 194o). In issuing the enforcement order the court held
also that the evidence demanded relates to the matter under investigation before the board.
Cf. Cudahy Packing Co. v. NLRB, 34 F. Supp. 53 (Kan. i94o), aff'd 3 C.C.H. Lab. Law Serv.
60,242 (C.C.A. xoth 1941); SEC v. Mallory (D.D.C. March 6, 1939), reported in Pike,
Cases on New Federal and Code Procedure 31-32 (1939).
548 Stat. io64 (1934), 28 U.S.C.A. § 723 (b) (Supp. 1940).
648 Stat. io64 (1934), 28 U.S.C.A. § 723(c) (Supp. 1940).

